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Abstract
This paper examines how banning affirmative action in university admissions affects
both overall academic achievement and the racial gap in academic achievement prior
to college entry. Focusing on college-bound high school students, we use a
difference-in-difference methodology to analyze the impact of the end of race-based
affirmative action at the University of California in 1998 on both the overall level of SAT
scores and high school GPA, and the racial gap in SAT scores and high school GPA. We
find little evidence of either a decline in academic achievement or a widening of the
racial gap in academic achievement after the ban.
JEL codes: I21; I24
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1 Introduction
Universities in the United States are increasingly limited in their ability to practice race-
based affirmative action. In the last two decades, public universities in a growing number
of states have stopped practicing race-based affirmative action due to various court
rulings, voter initiatives, and administrative decisions1. In addition, the United States
Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Fisher v. Texas makes it more difficult for universi-
ties to justify using race as a factor in admissions, and its 2014 ruling in Schuette v.
Coalition leaves the door open for additional states to implement statewide bans on affir-
mative action. The implications of eliminating race-based affirmative action in college
admissions are far-reaching and have been the subject of considerable legal, political, and
scholarly debate. In this paper, we focus on the potential effects of banning affirmative
action on academic achievement prior to college entry.
Economic theory suggests that eliminating affirmative action could have important
implications for human capital accumulation. There are a number of channels through
which this effect could operate. First, the removal of racial preferences directly affects
admissions probabilities, which in turn affects the return to studying prior to college
application. Second, banning affirmative action could lead underrepresented minorities
to feel institutionally discouraged from attending college, and they could respond by
putting forth less effort in preparing for postsecondary education. Finally, if colleges react
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to bans on affirmative action by changing their admissions process more broadly, then
this too could lead students to shift the focus of their efforts in high school.
While economic theory clearly predicts that ending affirmative action could affect
human capital investment, it does not yield definitive predictions about whether the over-
all level of human capital investment or the racial gap in human capital investment will
rise of fall2. Thus, the effect of banning affirmative action on human capital investment is
largely an empirical question.
In an attempt to answer this question, this paper explores the impact of Proposition 209,
which prohibited public universities in California from practicing race-based affirmative
action, on both the SAT scores and high school GPA of college-bound high school stu-
dents. In particular, using data from the College Board, we examine how these measures
of academic achievement changed in California relative to other states (a difference-in-
difference estimate), and how the racial gap in these measures changed in California
relative to other states (a triple-difference estimate). We find little evidence that the ban
had a negative impact on either overall academic achievement or the racial gap in aca-
demic achievement. This finding is consistent with previous research documenting a
limited behavioral response to California’s ban on affirmative action in terms of both col-
lege application behavior and college enrollment behavior (see, for example, Antonovics
and Backes (2013) and Antonovics and Sander (2013)).
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature, and Section 3
presents an overview California’s affirmative action ban. Section 4 discusses our empir-
ical strategy and gives a short overview of our data. Section 5 presents our results, and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The theoretical literature on affirmative action in college admissions emphasizes the dis-
tinction between “color-sighted affirmative action”, wherein colleges use explicit racial
preferences in admissions, and “color-blind affirmative action”, wherein colleges implic-
itly favor minorities by using admissions rules that favor students who possess char-
acteristics that are positively correlated with being a minority (see, for example, Fryer
et al. (2008), Ray and Sethi (2010) and Fryer and Loury (2013))3. Both forms of affirmative
action stand in contrast to laissez-faire admission regimes in which race is not considered
either explicitly or implicitly. In the case of California, it seems clear that Prop 209 shifted
most University of California (UC) schools from color-sighted to color-blind affirmative
action. That is, the UC administration openly acknowledged that diversity remained a
high priority even after Prop 209, and Antonovics and Backes (2014) provide evidence
that, after Prop 209, UC schools changed their admissions process to implicitly favor
minorities.
In their seminal paper, Coate and Loury (1993) show that affirmative action in the
labor market has an ambiguous theoretical effect on human capital investment. In the
context of college admissions, Fryer et al. (2008) establish that moving from color-
sighted to color-blind affirmative action alters students’ incentives to invest in human
capital, but their model does not yield definitive predictions about whether investment
will go up or down. For example, if the move from color-sighted to color-blind affir-
mative action lowers minorities’ admission rate (as was the case for California), then
this could dampen minorities’ incentives to invest in human capital since there is no
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point in investing if you have no chance of being admitted. On the other hand, reduc-
ing minorities’ chances of admission could increase human capital investment since it
may become more important to distinguish yourself as the field becomes more com-
petitive. Finally, Hickman (2012) and Hickman (2013) also model the link between
different admissions regimes and human capital investment, but do not consider color-
blind affirmative action, which we feel is essential to understanding the effects of Prop
2094.
A substantial number of papers examine the effect of affirmative action on academic
achievement (for a recent survey, see Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2014)). Of these, only
a handful use data from before and after a ban on affirmative action, with most focussing
on academic achievement after college entry (see, for example, Arcidiacono et al. (2014),
Backes (2012), Cortes (2010) and Hinrichs (2012)). To our knowledge, only two previ-
ous studies have directly examined the effect of a ban on affirmative action on academic
achievement prior to college entry, Furstenberg (2010) and Caldwell (2010). Both find evi-
dence that banning affirmative action increases the racial test score gap. We discuss these
papers in greater detail when we present our results in Section 5.
3 Background on California’s ban on affirmative action
The first threat to affirmative action in California was in July 1995, when the Board of
Regents of the University of California passed a resolution (SP-1), which stipulated that
the UC would discontinue considering race in admissions by the beginning of 1997. The
implementation of SP-1, however, was delayed. Then, in November 1996, California vot-
ers approved Prop 209, which banned the use of racial preferences at public universities5.
Prop 209 underwent various legal challenges until the Supreme Court denied further
appeals in November 1997. Thus, the incoming class of 1998 was the first to be admitted
under the statewide ban on affirmative action. Table 1 presents a timeline of the events
leading up to the ban.
Although the prohibition against affirmative action applied to all public universities in
California, in practice it only affected UC schools because at the time most Cal State
schools were not very selective, admitting the vast majority of applicants, regardless of
race. Given that one in six Californian high school graduates apply to at least one UC
campus, however, it is reasonable to think that major policy changes at the UC could
affect the human capital investment for the state as a whole6. In addition, because it was
Table 1 California’s proposition 209 timeline
Date Event
Spring 1995 1996 graduation cohort begins taking SAT
July 1995 Regents of UC pass SP-1
Fall 1995 1996 graduation cohort finishes taking SAT
Spring 1996 1997 cohort begins taking SAT
July 1996 First mention of Prop 209 in media
November 1996 Prop 209 passed by voters
Fall 1996 1997 cohort finishes taking SAT
Spring-Fall 1997 1998 cohort takes SAT
November 1997 Supreme Court declines to review case, Prop 209 becomes law
Fall 1998 First affected cohort (1998) enrolls
Notes: See text for description.
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so controversial, Proposition 209 received a tremendous amount of coverage in themedia.
For example, between July 1996 and July 2001, over 900 articles in the Los Angeles Times
contained the phrase “Proposition 209” (roughly one every other day). Thus, it seems
likely that high school students were aware of Prop 209.
Prop 209 also had an enormous impact on the minorities at the more selective UC
schools7. For example, the fraction of URM applicants admitted to Berkeley plummeted
from 52 percent to 25 percent between the three-year period immediately before and
the three-year period immediately after the ban. In contrast, the admission rates of non-
minority applicants to Berkeley only fell from 32 percent to 28 percent over that same
time period.
Evidence that students’ human capital investment decisions respond to the incentives
created by college admissions policies is evident in Cortes and Friedson (2014) and Cullen
et al. (2013), both of which find evidence of students moving to lower quality high schools
after Texas introduced its top ten percent plan, which guaranteed admission to any public
university in Texas for students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school
class.
Nonetheless, isolating the effect of the end of race-based affirmative action at the UC is
complicated by a number of concomitant policy changes. First, in an effort to minimize
the effects of Prop 209 on minority enrollment, the UC system substantially increased
minority outreach efforts8. It is unclear, however, howmuch of an effect the new outreach
programs had on the applicant pool in the years immediately following Prop 209 since
many of these programs took years to fully develop and were long-term in nature. To
the extent that increased outreach had an effect on academic achievement, our estimates
represent the net effect of ending race-based affirmative action and the accompanying
change in outreach.
In addition to the increase in outreach, there were two major policy changes in
California around the same time as Prop 209. First, the 1999 passage of the Public
Schools Accountability Act brought about substantial changes to the public K-12 schools
in California. In particular, beginning in 2000, schools were eligible for rewards if all eth-
nic subgroups within schools either scored above a certain threshold or met targets for
test score growth. In addition, schools with low test scores could opt into an intervention
program designed for schools not meeting growth targets. Second, in 2001, the UC imple-
mented Eligibility in the Local Context (ELC), guaranteeing any student in the top four
percent of his or her high school class admission to at least one UC school (conditional on
completing specified coursework). The new policy was designed to attract students from
high schools that did not typically send many students to the UC, giving the UC a way to
potentially increase minority enrollment. Since both of these policy changes are likely to
have affected human capital accumulation, we perform robustness checks by removing
observations from 2000 and later from our analysis and find no substantial impact on our
main results.
Finally, we note that the long-run effects of Proposition 209 on SAT scores and high
school GPA are likely to be larger than the short-run effects. In the short run, any change
in students’ SAT scores or high school GPA is likely to primarily reflect a change in stu-
dent effort. In the long run, however, changes in students’ SAT scores and high school
GPA additionally may reflect changes in accumulated knowledge and skill. Since our data
only allow us to examine students graduating from high school in the four-year period
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immediately following the implementation of Prop 209 (1998–2001), our results are likely
to reflect the intermediate-run effects Prop 209.
4 Estimation and data
Antonovics and Backes (2014) provide evidence that Prop 209 led to widespread shifts
in the entire admission process at many UC schools. In particular, the more selective UC
schools appear to have decreased the weight placed on SAT scores and increased the
weight given to high school GPA and family background characteristics in order to boost
minority admission rates after Prop 209 went into effect. This is important because the
apparent reduced emphasis on SAT scores and increased emphasis on high school GPA
might have led to a shift away from human capital investments that increase SAT scores
towards those that increase high school GPA. For this reason, we separately examine the
effect of Prop 209 on these two measures of academic achievement.
In addition, we measure the effects of the policy change in two ways. First, we explore
the reaction of Californians relative to the rest of the country. Second, we document how
the gap between whites and underrepresented minorities (URMs) changed in California
relative to the rest of the country9. Each of the two measures is important. Since
Californians of all races were affected by the changes in the admissions policies at UC
schools, they may be thought of as one treated group. Comparing Californians to those
in other states reveals the extent to which Prop 209 changed academic achievement for
all Californians. On the other hand, affirmative action policies are generally thought of
as a way to address the gap between white and minority students. Viewed in this way, it
is natural to ask how the removal of explicit racial preferences affected the racial gap in
academic achievement.
4.1 Empirical strategy
To examine the effect of Prop 209 on academic achievement, we estimate the following:
Outcomeist = β0CAs + β1Postst + β2URMi
+ β01CAsPostst + β02CAsURMi + β12PoststURMi (1)
+ β012CAsPoststURMi
+ βXi + ist ,
where Outcomeist is the outcome (SAT score or high school GPA) for student i in state s
in year t. Postst is an indicator for whether the affirmative action ban was in place in state
s in year t, CAs is an indicator for whether the student resides in California, and URMi
is an indicator for an individual’s race. Finally, Xi includes controls for parental income,
education, gender, whether English is the student’s first language, citizenship status, and
a constant term. Following the discussion at the beginning of this section, there are two
coefficients of interest. First, to the extent that Californians had a common response to
Prop 209, it would be captured by β01, which represents the change in the dependent
variable for white Californians relative to the rest of the country. Second, β012 represents
the change in the minority-white test score gap in California relative to the rest of the
country.
There are two important choices that must be made in estimating Equation (1). The
first is which cohorts to include. As discussed above, there was an extended period of
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uncertainty surrounding the end of race-based affirmative action at the UC. Table 1 shows
the timing of events leading up to the implementation of Prop 209 along with the timing
of when various graduation cohorts are likely to have taken the SAT. As the table indi-
cates, the first major threat to affirmative action at the UC came in July 1995 when the
Regents of California passed SP-1, which committed the UC system to an eventual ban
on the use of racial preference in admissions. It was not until over two years later, how-
ever, in November 1997, when Prop 209 officially became law that the UC stopped the
use of explicit racial preferences. Thus, students who took the SAT between July 1995
and November 1997 (those in the 1996–1998 graduation cohorts) did so during a time
of considerable uncertainty about the future of race-based affirmative action. As a result,
we experiment with two different pre and post period definitions: (i) 1994–1996 vs 1998–
2001 and (ii) 1994–1995 vs 1999–2001. The first choice of sample years drops only the
1997 cohort, which took the SAT during the election cycle in which Prop 209 was on the
ballot. The second choice of sample years takes a more conservative approach by drop-
ping any cohort that could have taken the SAT during a period of uncertainty about Prop
209. However, it leaves only two years in the pre period and three in the post period.
The second important choice is whether to include an interaction term between the
post period and demographic characteristics. By not including such an interaction,
time-varying changes in the relationship between demographic characteristics and the
outcome variable would be picked up by the coefficient on Post*URM, due to the cor-
relation between race and demographic characteristics. However, if the effects of the
policy operated in part through changes in the relationship between demographic char-
acteristics and the outcome variable (due to, for example, changes in the weights placed
on different student characteristics in determining admissions), the researcher may be
interested in omitting the interaction between the post period and demographics to
allow the changes to load onto the URM*Post coefficient. We present results from both
specifications.
In practice, we also expand our estimating equation to include the full set of interactions
for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, with whites as the excluded group. We also use year
fixed effects and state fixed effects, and we include state-specific linear time trends. We
drop observations from Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Washington, which
were affected by their own affirmative action policy changes during our sample period.
We also drop North Dakota and Wyoming due to small sample sizes of minority SAT
test takers10. Finally, we normalize test scores and GPA to be mean zero with standard
deviation one.
Asians, who constitute a large portion of the college-going population in California, are
not considered URMs for the purposes of admissions to the UC. We estimate effects on
Asians separately but generally do not focus on their results because blacks and Hispanics
were the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action policy at the UC and because the
outcomes for Asians and whites are generally similar11.
4.2 Estimation of standard errors with limited treated units
A growing number of papers have documented the inadequacy of typical methods of
obtaining standard errors when the number of treated units is small (see Moulton (1990),
Wooldridge: Cluster-sample methods in applied econometrics: an extended analysis,
unpublished, Donald and Lang (2007), Abadie et al. (2010), and Buchmueller et al. (2011)).
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To illustrate the problem, consider SAT scores as the outcome variable and suppose we
are interested in β01, which measures the change in test scores for Californians relative
to the rest of the country. Since SAT scores naturally fluctuate from year to year within
a state even in the absence of a policy change, it is important to distinguish these fluc-
tuations from the true policy effect. This is done in the typical DD setting by assuming
that these state-specific, year-to-year fluctuations average out to a mean of zero over a
large number of treatment and control states. In our case, there is only one treated unit,
so there is little reason to believe this assumption holds.
We follow an established method of dealing with the problem of only one treated state
by using the remaining untreated states to conduct a permutation test in which we con-
struct the empirical distribution of β01 by estimating βˆ01 for each of the control states,
treating each control state as the treated state (see Abadie et al. (2010) and Buchmueller
et al. (2011))12. Thus, the control states are used to estimate the variability of βˆ01 that is
driven by year-to-year variation in test scores. The null hypothesis – that Prop 209 had
no effect on academic achievement in California – is rejected when βˆCalifornia01 is large rel-
ative to the estimated empirical distribution of βˆ j01 for the control states (j indexes the
control states). This procedure tests whether the change in test scores in California is
large relative to the naturally occurring variation in test scores observed in other states.
We also estimate βˆCalifornia012 and βˆ
j
012 for each of the states in our data to measure whether
the change in the minority-white gap in California was extreme relative to the change in
states that did not ban affirmative action in the same time period. This correction reveals
substantial within-state year-to-year variability in SAT scores.
Of course, one solution to the above problem would be to include more treated states.
However, most states that banned affirmative action have done so too recently to be con-
tained in our data13. Two states that banned affirmative action during the period for
which we have data are Texas and Florida; however, each introduced top x % plans in
which the top x % of students within a high school were guaranteed admission to an in-
state public university14. Louisiana and Mississippi were both affected by the court ruling
that ended affirmative action in Texas, but both states were under desegregation orders,
so they may not have been under pressure to comply with the ruling15. In addition, nei-
ther state’s public universities are as selective as the institutions typically affected by bans
on racial preferences (see Blume and Long (2014)). Of the affirmative action banning
states, the sole remainder is Washington, which voted to ban affirmative action in 1999.
In principle, Washington could be included with our analysis; however, using two policy
change states instead of one would still be insufficient for classical estimation of standard
errors16. Finally, there are several advantages to using California. First, it is a large state
with a significant URM population. In addition, it has been well-established that the more
selective UC schools practiced significant race-based affirmative action prior to Prop 209,
and finally, the measurement of how admissions rules changed at the UC after Prop 209
has been documented by Antonovics and Backes (2014).
4.3 Data
Our College Board data consist of SAT test takers who are expected to graduate from
high school between 1994 and 200117. The sample consists of all black and Hispanic test
takers nationwide, all Californian test takers, and a 25 percent random sample of the
rest of the country. The College Board includes a range of descriptive variables that are
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generated when students fill out the Student Descriptive Questionnaire before taking the
exam. These include race, gender, parental characteristics, college aspirations, high school
GPA, and many other variables. Our data also identify each students’ high school grad-
uation cohort, and we assume that students in a given graduation cohort took the SAT
between the spring and fall of the preceding year. In addition, to the extent that students
took the SAT multiple times, our data only reveal students’ last SAT score. Vigdor and
Clotfelter (2003) show that students’ SAT scores tend to increase when they retake the
SAT. Thus, if Prop 209 lowered students’ incentive to retake the SAT (perhaps because
SAT scores became less important in determining admission), then this is likely to show
up as a decline in average SAT scores.
One advantage of using the College Board sample is that nearly all SAT takers are
interested in going to college, so they should be the onesmost readily affected by the affir-
mative action ban. On the other hand, a potential problem with using the College Board
is that a student’s decision about whether to take the SAT could be affected by Prop 209,
leading to possible sample selection bias. Dickson (2006) finds that removal of affirmative
action in Texas led to a decline in the percentage of minority high school graduates who
take either the ACT or SAT of roughly 3–4 percent. If Prop 209 led to a similar drop in
the fraction of URMs who took the SAT in California, then to the extent that these stu-
dents were differentially likely to score poorly on the SAT, this could lead us to understate
the true drop in the relative performance of URMs. We discuss this issue in a later section
below.
Table 2 College board summary statistics
California Rest of country
All Black Hispanic White Asian All Black Hispanic White Asian
SAT 514 427 453 536 548 513 424 464 524 559
Math
(114) (101) (101) (102) (120) (110) (96.5) (106) (104) (120)
SAT 495 434 445 529 485 511 435 467 525 502
Verbal
(114) (103) (103) (102) (123) (107) (98.4) (108) (101) (128)
GPA 3.26 2.89 3.1 3.33 3.38 3.22 2.9 3.04 3.26 3.37
(.627) (.624) (.624) (.602) (.612) (.659) (.661) (.659) (.645) (.64)
Male .41 .43 .42 .46 .47 .46 .41 .43 .46 .48
U.S. .86 .96 .83 .95 .67 .95 .94 .83 .98 .68
citizen
ESL .20 .03 .36 .05 .43 .05 .02 .28 .02 .38
Income 5.31 3.96 3.65 6.54 4.54 5.65 3.7 3.97 6.06 5.09
($10,000s)
(3.5) (2.93) (2.75) (3.46) (3.37) (3.27) (2.7) (3.03) (3.21) (3.46)
Mom 13.9 14.5 10.6 15.4 13.6 14.8 14.3 13 15 14.1
educ
(yrs)
(4.32) (3.1) (5.28) (2.88) (4.54) (3.18) (3.11) (4.26) (2.98) (4.33)
Dad 14.4 14.3 10.8 15.9 14.4 15.1 13.9 13.1 15.4 15.1
educ
(yrs)
(4.49) (3.28) (5.51) (3.1) (4.43) (3.43) (3.33) (4.62) (3.22) (4.29)
Observations 829336 56636 172424 410050 190226 1608725 490165 186190 867729 64641
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Rest of country excludes California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas,
Washington, North Dakota, and Wyoming. Sample includes 1994–1996 and 1998–2001.
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Basic summary statistics for our College Board sample are displayed in Table 2.
Californians are quite similar to the rest of the country in terms of SAT scores and high
school GPA, but, as might be expected, a smaller fraction are U.S. citizens and a larger
fraction speak English as a second language. In both California and the rest of the U.S.,
blacks and Hispanics tend to score lower on the SAT, have lower GPAs, and have parents
with lower levels of education.
5 Results
5.1 Overview of trends in test scores
As a first pass at gauging the effects of Prop 209 on SAT scores and high school GPA,
we plot normalized (mean zero and standard deviation one) average SAT scores by race
and year in Figure 1. Panels (a) and (b) show normalized SAT math and verbal scores for
Californians and the rest of the U.S. Although whites tend to score higher than URMs, the
gap appears to be roughly stable over time. Panel (c) shows normalized high school GPA.
The patterns in the figure underscore the importance of controlling for state-specific time
trends: there was a gradual rise in GPA over time that began before the implementation
of the preference ban.
5.2 Regression results
Panel 1 of Table 3 presents results when including all but the 1997 cohort. The first
three columns display our results when we include controls for demographic char-
acteristics but not for the interaction between demographic characteristics and the
post-Prop 209 indicator. In terms of the effect of Prop 209 on the overall level of
academic achievement, for California relative to the rest of the country, we find that
after Prop 209 there was a 0.003 standard deviation increase in SAT math scores and
a 0.020 standard deviation increase in SAT verbal scores. We also find a 0.019 stan-
dard deviation relative increase in high school GPA. While the direction of these point
estimates indicates an overall increase in academic achievement in California relative
to the rest of the country, we note that the magnitudes are small and, on balance,
suggest that Prop 209 had no meaningful impact on the overall level of academic
achievement.
In terms of the racial gap in academic achievement, for California relative to the rest of
the country, we find a reduction in both the black-white SAT gap and the black-whiteGPA
gap. In addition, while we find an increase in Hispanic-white SAT gap (with the estimated
0.026 standard deviation increase in the Hispanic-white SAT math gap, for example, rep-
resenting about 3.5 SAT points, or about 4 percent of the Hispanic-white SAT math gap
in California), we also find a reduction in the Hispanic-white high school GPA gap. Thus,
our findings do not generally support the notion that banning affirmative action widens
racial gaps in academic achievement.
Columns (4)-(6) present results when allowing the coefficients on the demographic con-
trols to vary in the post period. Results are generally similar but smaller in magnitude
since part of the effect that was previously captured by the URM*Post coefficient is now
contained in the Demographics*Post coefficients.
Panel 2 further restricts the sample by dropping each of the 1996 through 1998 cohorts
from the analysis. Many coefficients become larger in magnitude, especially when com-
paring Californians to the rest of the country. For example, the estimated performance
2014, 3:5
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/5


























































































Figure 1 College Board outcome variables. Each panel shows the mean of the normalized outcome
(mean zero and standard deviation one) by race and year. The U.S. panel excludes California, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Washington, North Dakota, and Wyoming. (a) SAT Math Scores (b) SAT Verbal
Scores (c) High School GPA.
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Table 3 College board SAT and GPADDD estimates
SAT M SAT V GPA SAT M SAT V GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: 1994–6 (pre) vs 1998–2001 (post)
Post*CA 0.003 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.001 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
[-.13, .14] [-.11, .14] [-.13, .18] [-.14, .13] [-.11, .13] [-.13, .18]
Post*Black*CA 0.022** 0.011 0.069*** 0.024** 0.013* 0.067***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
[-.29, .22] [-.2, .2] [-.19, .29] [-.29, .23] [-.22, .2] [ -.18, .28]
Post*Hispanic*CA -0.026*** -0.029*** 0.062** -0.016*** -0.018*** 0.073***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.027) (0.005) (0.007) (0.025)
[-.15, .32] [-.18, .37] [-.13, .3] [-.16, .3] [-.17, .36] [-.13, .28]
Observations 2488390 2488390 2574569 2488390 2488390 2574569
R-squared 0.255 0.239 0.136 0.255 0.239 0.136
Panel 2: 1994–5 (pre) vs 1999–2001 (post)
Post*CA 0.001 0.046*** 0.014 -0.001 0.042*** 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
[-.22, .14] [-.26, .22] [-.23, .24] [-.23, .13] [-.26, .21] [-.24, .24]
Post*Black*CA 0.023 0.004 0.082*** 0.025* 0.008 0.080***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014)
[-.24, .22] [-.15, .35] [-.16, .39] [-.25, .21] [-.17, .35] [-.16, .38]
Post*Hispanic*CA -0.040*** -0.045*** 0.062* -0.028*** -0.034*** 0.073**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.035) (0.005) (0.006) (0.034)
[-.16, .35] [-.16, .27] [-.16, .34] [-.18, .32] [-.16, .26] [-.16, .32]
Observations 1845603 1845603 1907498 1845603 1845603 1907498
R-squared 0.257 0.241 0.138 0.257 0.242 0.138
Demographics x x x x x x
Post*Demographics x x x
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient estimates from a regression of the outcome variable listed at the top of each
column on an indictor for whether the student was from California, an indictor for whether they took the SAT in the post
period, and an indicator for the student’s race, along with the full set of interactions between these variables. Additional
controls for parental education and income, gender, first language spoken, and citizenship status are also included in the
regressions. All outcome variables normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Included time trends are linear state-specific time trends. The excluded racial group includes white, other, and unknown.
Excludes Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, Texas, Washington, North Dakota, and Wyoming. Clustered standard errors shown in
parenthesis. Confidence intervals generated by permutation tests displayed in brackets.
Significance indicators associated with clustered standard errors: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
gain of Californians on the SAT verbal section increases from .02 standard deviations
to .046 standard deviations when dropping the additional years. Again, the estimates
become somewhat smaller in magnitude when including Post*Demographic interactions
as shown in columns (4)-(6).
The standard errors in Table 3 are generated by clustering at the state level. However, as
discussed above, the presence of one policy change statemay result in standard errors that
are misleadingly small. As a result, we conduct permutation tests in which we generate
a coefficient ‘estimate’ for each of the 44 states in our data using the specification which
resulted in the largest point estimates – columns (1)-(3) of panel 2. Figure 2 plots his-
tograms of these placebo coefficient estimates, with the red line indicating the coefficient
estimate for California. In addition, the confidence intervals obtained by the permuta-
tion tests are shown in brackets in each of the regression tables. The point estimates for
California are generally extremely small relative to the other states. However, given the
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Figure 2 Placebo Test Coefficients. Distribution of DDD coefficient estimates for each of the 44 states in the
sample, with California represented by red line. See text. (a) CA*Post (b) CA*Post*Black (c) CA*Post*Hispanic.
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wide range of coefficient estimates from other states, we would be unable to detect even
a large change in California.
In seeking to understand the imprecision of our estimates, we plot average SAT math
scores by state and year for the first eight states alphabetically18. The plot is displayed
in Figure 3, with California represented by the dashed line19. A naive look at the graphic
would suggest a very small increase in the Californian SATmath scores in the post period.
However, two factors prevent being able to make a definitive causal statement about the
change in Californian performance due to Prop 209. First, the small increase in SATmath
scores was part of a general upward trend in both California and the rest of the country
(see Panel (a) of Figure 1). Second, the other states shown in Figure 3 generally have sub-
stantial year-to-year variability, which does not show up in the “U.S.” panel of Figure 1a
since all the states are averaged together. Thus, considerable year-to-year variation within
each state makes it difficult to make definitive statements about the causal effect of the
policy change despite the very large sample sizes in the College Board.
Despite the inherent problem with performing a difference-in-difference estimation
with one policy change state, we believe that the small point estimates are noteworthy in
themselves. As discussed above, Prop 209 led to substantial changes in URM admissions
rates and in the UC admissions process. However, despite these changes, we find that the
performance of Californians as a whole and of black students relative to white students
was relatively stable. Even Hispanics, who appear to have performed worse on the SAT in
the post period, saw an increase in their high school GPAs. Thus, for neither Californians
as a whole nor for any minority group within California do we find consistent evidence of
lower academic achievement in response to Prop 209.
It is possible that our small estimated effect sizes are the result of including many
students whowould be unaffected by Prop 209 because they are unlikely to attend the top-
tier UC campuses where the effects of Prop 209 were strongest. In our sample, only one
in six Californians applies to a UC campus, and even fewer to a selective campus where

























SAT Math Scores in Various States
Figure 3 Mean of normalized SAT math scores.Mean zero and standard deviation one.
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to be most affected by the policy change, we predict which students would have a high
likelihood of sending an SAT score to either Berkeley or UCLA. Specifically, for cohorts
in the pre-Prop 209 period, we regress the likelihood of score-sending to at least one of
Berkeley or UCLA on demographic characteristics that plausibly were not affected by
Prop 209, which consist of parental education and income, race, gender, whether English
was the first language spoken, and citizenship status. We then use the coefficients to
predict score-sending for the entire sample, both in the pre and post periods. The den-
sity of predicted Berkeley or UCLA score-sending is shown in Figure 4, with the vertical
lines denoting cutoff points between quartiles of score-sending likelihood. We keep the
top quartile of predicted score-senders to generate a sample of students likely to be most
affected by Prop 209.
We then run the same regressions as previously on this selected sample. Results for
these likely Berkeley or UCLA score-senders are shown in Table 4. Coefficient esti-
mates continue to be small, with the possible exception of an estimated reduction in the
Hispanic-white GPA gap20.
5.3 Robustness to selection of SAT test takers
As mentioned earlier, a potential concern about using a sample of SAT test takers is that
if Prop 209 led to a drop in the fraction of URMs who took the SAT in California, then to
the extent that these students were disproportionately drawn from the low end of the SAT
distribution (conditional on observable characteristics), this would lead us to understate
the true drop in the relative performance of URMs.
To explore this issue, we examine the trend in the number of SAT takers fromCalifornia
as a fraction of the number of California public high school graduates from 1995–2001
using data from the 1997–2003 Digest of Education Statistics21. Results are shown in









0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Probability
Density of Predicted Score−Sending Likelihood
Figure 4 Density of predicted score-sending. Predicted score-sending obtained by regressing the
likelihood of score-sending for Californian pre-period cohorts to at least one of Berkeley or UCLA on
demographic characteristics consisting of parental education and income, race, gender, first language
spoken, and citizenship status. Details in text. Each vertical line represents the boundary of a quartile.
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Table 4 College board SAT and GPADDD estimates for students in top quartile by
likelihood of score-sending to Berkeley or UCLA
SAT M SAT V GPA SATM SAT V GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994–6 (pre) vs 1998–2001 (post)
Post*CA 0.009 0.017 0.028 0.017 0.021 0.036**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018)
[-.6, .31] [-1.1, .28] [-.85, .56] [-.6, .3] [-1.1, .27] [-.86, .55]
Post*Black*CA 0.014 0.033** -0.014 -0.006 0.031** -0.016
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
[-.5, .55] [-.51, .76] [-.51, .61] [-.52, .55] [-.51, .76] [-.51, .61]
Post*Hisp*CA 0.002 0.011 0.078*** -0.001 0.012 0.072***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018)
[-.38, .78] [-.32, .77] [-.38, .38] [-.4, .75] [-.31, .74] [-.38, .37]
Observations 347122 347122 353738 347122 347122 353738
R-squared 0.183 0.269 0.088 0.187 0.272 0.090
1994–5 (pre) vs 1999–2001 (post)
Post*CA -0.015 0.026 0.052 -0.006 0.030 0.062*
(0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.030) (0.034)
[-.92, .6] [-1.1, .39] [-1.2, .72] [-.93, .59] [-1.1, .4] [-1.2, .71]
Post*Black*CA -0.002 0.029 -0.014 -0.023 0.024 -0.012
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
[-.39, .52] [-.4, .71] [-.82, .87] [-.37, .51] [-.4, .69] [-.82, .86]
Post*Hisp*CA -0.003 -0.000 0.065** -0.009 0.003 0.061**
(0.023) (0.015) (0.030) (0.017) (0.014) (0.023)
[-.56, 1.1] [-.53, .66] [-.42, .55] [-.55, 1.1] [-.52, .64] [-.43, .54]
Observations 252871 252871 257127 252871 252871 257127
R-squared 0.184 0.269 0.088 0.189 0.272 0.091
Demographics x x x x x x
Post*Demographics x x x
Notes: Compares Californians in the top predicted quartile of score-sending to Berkeley or UCLA with students in other
states who would have been predicted to be in that quartile had they been in California. See notes from Table 3.
Significance indicators associated with clustered standard errors: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
SAT after Prop 209, especially in 1998. Relative to white students, black students were
two percentage points less likely to take the SAT in the post period (authors’ calculation),
which is equivalent to about four percent of black SAT test takers. On the other hand, rel-
ative to white students, there was no change in the share of Hispanic students who took
the SAT.
As mentioned above, if it were the case that the fall in the fraction of black SAT takers
was driven by blacks at the bottom end of the SAT score distribution, our estimates would
understate the drop in the relative SAT scores of blacks. In order to gauge the magnitude
of this potential bias, we conduct a simulation in whichwe artificially increase the number
of black SAT test takers in the post period in California by identifying the bottom one
percent of Californian post-period black SAT scorers and replicating each four times (to
“recover” the estimated 4 percent drop suggested by Figure 5).
Results with these “extra” low-achieving Californian post-period black students are
shown in Table 5. Not surprisingly, we now find a drop in the relative SAT scores of blacks
after Prop 209. Overall, the results for blacks now mirror those for Hispanics, with an
increase in theminority-white SAT gap and decrease in theminority-whiteGPA gap. This
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Figure 5 Share of SAT Takers. Fraction of high school graduates by race in California who took the SAT.
pattern is interesting as it suggests that blacks and Hispanics may have responded to the
new post-Prop 209 admissions rules at the UC, which placed less weight on SAT scores
and more weight on high school GPA. Importantly, however, we do not find evidence of
a uniform drop in relative minority achievement.
As a second way of addressing potential selection into taking the SAT,we note that high-
achieving students likely to apply to Berkeley and UCLA are unlikely to have reduced the
rate at which they took the SAT after Prop 209. As shown in Table 4, when we restrict our
sample to students with a high probability of applying to Berkeley or UCLA, we find no
evidence on an increase in either the minority-white SAT gap or the minority-white GPA
gap.
5.4 Why our findings differ from previous work
Standing in contrast to the results presented here, Furstenberg (2010) finds a statisti-
cally significant widening of the black-white SAT gap in California following Prop 209.
However, our analysis improves upon his in several ways. First, his College Board sample
only includes the 1996–2000 cohorts; his paper compares the 1996–1997 cohorts to the
1998–2000 cohorts. However, interpreting results from 1996–1998 is difficult since, as
discussed above, the UC Regents first announced their intention to end their use of racial
preferences in July 1995. Thus, it is possible that students began responding to the policy
change long before 1998, his first post-policy change year. Second, Furstenberg’s data con-
sist of a 30-percent sample of SAT takers, while we have obtained a more comprehensive
dataset containing all Californian test takers, all black and Hispanic test takers nation-
wide, and a 25-percent sample of the remaining non-Californian whites. All together, our
sample contain 51 percent of test takers during the 1994 to 2001 period. As a result, our
estimates are obtained from a much larger sample.
An additional previous empirical study of the impact of affirmative action bans on
human capital accumulation, Caldwell (2010), examines PIAT math test scores using the
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Table 5 Sensitivity of estimates to selection by black students
SAT M SAT V GPA SAT M SAT V GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: 1994–6 (pre) vs 1998–2001 (post)
Post*CA 0.005 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.003 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
[-.13, .14] [-.11, .14] [-.13, .18] [-.14, .13] [-.11, .13] [-.13, .18]
Post*Black*CA -0.049*** -0.065*** 0.057*** -0.047*** -0.063*** 0.055***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
[-.28, .23] [-.19, .21] [-.19, .29] [-.29, .24] [-.21, .21] [-.18, .29]
Post*Hispanic*CA -0.026*** -0.029*** 0.062** -0.016*** -0.018*** 0.073***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.027) (0.005) (0.007) (0.025)
[-.15, .32] [-.18, .37] [-.13, .3] [-.16, .3] [-.17, .36] [-.13, .28]
Observations 2488390 2488390 2574569 2488390 2488390 2574569
R-squared 0.256 0.239 0.136 0.256 0.240 0.136
Panel 2: 1994–5 (pre) vs 1999–2001 (post)
Post*CA 0.003 0.048*** 0.014 0.001 0.044*** 0.014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
[-.22, .14] [-.26, .22] [-.23, .24] [-.23, .13] [-.26, .21] [-.24, .24]
Post*Black*CA -0.052*** -0.076*** 0.070*** -0.050*** -0.072*** 0.068***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015)
[-.23, .22] [-.14, .36] [-.16, .39] [-.24, .21] [-.17, .35] [-.16, .38]
Post*Hispanic*CA -0.040*** -0.045*** 0.062* -0.028*** -0.034*** 0.073**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.035) (0.005) (0.006) (0.034)
[-.16, .34] [-.16, .27] [-.16, .34] [-.18, .32] [-.16, .26] [-.16, .32]
Observations 1845603 1845603 1907498 1845603 1845603 1907498
R-squared 0.258 0.242 0.138 0.258 0.242 0.139
Demographics x x x x x x
Post*Demographics x x x
Notes: See notes from Table 3.
The observations of the lowest 1 percent of SAT scores for Californian post-period blacks are replicated an additional four
times to test for sensitivity to selection. See text.
Significance indicators associated with clustered standard errors: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
Children of the NLSY 79 (CNLSY). Caldwell finds that Prop 209 increased the racial test
score gap. We obtained the same restricted version of the CNLSY used by Caldwell and
successfully replicated his findings. However, there are several issues with his analysis.
First, the CNLSY was not designed to yield a representative sample at the state level.
From the NLS FAQ22,
The National Longitudinal Surveys are designed to represent specific birth cohorts at the
national level. The surveys cannot provide representative estimates for States [...] NLS
data files with geographic variables are available on a restricted basis for authorized
researchers to use, but the permitted uses do not include producing estimates for States.
Thus, it may be difficult to generalize the findings obtained from the CNLSY because it
is not a randomly selected sample of Californians. While the College Board data used in
this paper is also not representative of all Californian high school students, it does include
all Californian SAT test takers and these are the most likely to respond to Prop 209.
Compounding the non-representativeness of the CNLSY sample are the relatively small
sample sizes in the panel. For example, one of Caldwell’s strongest results – suggesting
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that the PIAT math scores of 13 and 14 year olds fell considerably for blacks in California
relative to blacks in the rest of the country – is estimated from only 62 Californian blacks,
with 17 of these from the period after Prop 209. This is important because, as noted
in Wooldridge: Cluster-sample methods in applied econometrics: an extended analysis,
unpublished, small sample sizes exacerbate the problems inherent to estimation with only
one policy change state23.
Finally, neither Furstenberg nor Caldwell takes into account the limited number of
treated states in evaluating the statistical significance of their results.
6 Conclusion
Much of the popular debate surrounding affirmative action in higher education focuses
on how it affects the allocation of students to universities, taking the achievement of
high school graduates as fixed. However, the disparities in educational preparation which
drive racial differences in enrollment at selective colleges arise early in the education pro-
cess and are formed well before college admissions come into play. As affirmative action
was originally conceived to mitigate these gaps in racial achievement, it is natural to ask
whether and how the removal of racial preferences affects these gaps. In addition, a num-
ber of scholars have pointed out that since policies such as Prop 209 give colleges and
universities an incentive to place a greater weight on non-academic factors in determin-
ing admissions, they could lower student quality by weakening all students’ incentives to
invest in their academic qualifications prior to college entry.
Our results provide little support for the idea that the end of raced-based affirmative
action at the UC lowered either overall academic achievement or the academic achieve-
ment of minorities relative to whites. This finding is consistent with several previous
studies that have shown a minimal response to Prop 209 in terms of both application
behavior and enrollment behavior.
Endnotes
1Establishing the list of states in which race-based affirmative action has been
prohibited is complicated by ambiguities in case law, but arguably includes Alabama,
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Texas and Washington. See Blume and Long (2014) for a nice
discussion of the policy environment surrounding affirmative action.
2We discuss the theoretical literature in greater detail below.
3In this paper, we use the terms “color-sighted affirmative action” and “race-based
affirmative action” interchangeably.
4 Hickman’s color-blind admission policy (in which universities do not consider race
at all) differs from color-blind affirmative action (in which colleges implicitly favor
minorities).
5Searching the LexisNexis article database gives the first mention of Prop 209 in July
1996.
6Calculation made using UC application data (http://www.ucop.edu/news/archives/
2001/applications_2001/table1.pdf) and California high school graduation data (http://
www.cpec.ca.gov/completereports/2003reports/03-09/Display1.PDF).
7The UC uses the term underrepresented minority to refer to blacks, Hispanics and
Native Americans.
8For example, “In an attempt to improve minority access to UC without the help of
affirmative action, the university’s investment in kindergarten-through-12th-grade
outreach has rocketed from about $60 million in 1995 to $180 million last year and a
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planned $250 million this year” (2000, January 21). UC Regents Urged to Step Up
Minority Outreach at Schools. The San Francisco Chronicle.
9At the UC, URMs include Hispanics, blacks and Native Americans.
10In principle, these two states could be included in our base specification estimated
by Equation 1. However, including these states in the permutation tests we discuss below
is problematic because the limited number of minority students cause wildly variable
estimates within those states.
11Adding Asians to the excluded group in the DDD regressions gives similar results.
12When estimating β01 for states other than California, California is treated as a
control state.
13These states include Alabama (2002), Arizona (2010), Georgia (2002), Michigan
(2006), Nebraska (2008), and Oklahoma (2012).
14In Texas, students could attend a university of their choice while in Florida,
admission was guaranteed to at least one public university.
15For example: Healy, Patrick (1998, April 24). Affirmative Action Survives at Colleges
in Some States Covered by Hopped Ruling. The Chronicle of Higher Education.
Retrieved from http://www.chronicle.com.
16The results for the black-white and Hispanic-white gaps presented in this paper are
similar when including Texas and Washington with the treatment group.
17In April 1995, the College Board recentered the SAT score scales to reestablish a
mean score of about 500. To ensure consistency over time, we use College
Board-provided recentered scores for all years.
18The other control states are similar to those shown here but are not displayed in the
figure due to lack of clarity when too many states are plotted at once.
19The relative ranking of the states shown in Figure 3 is largely driven by SAT
participation rates, with low participation rates generally corresponding to high average
scores. For example, Alabama has relatively high average SAT scores despite its poor
performance on most standardized tests, such as the NAEP, because only about 10% of
high school graduates in Alabama take the SAT.
20We also investigated children of parents who attended at least some college.
Unsurprisingly, these results are similar to the full sample since about 80% of the sample
has at least one parent who attended at least some college.
21Published by the National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education
Sciences, U.S. Department of Education. Washington, DC. Available at http://nces.ed.
gov/programs/digest/; Accessed: 05/18/2012.
22http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaqs.htm#anch14.
23The authors also obtained restricted-use data from the eighth grade math sample of
the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which has the advantage of
being designed to be representative at the state level. However, the NAEP suffers from
two serious drawbacks. First, background information is relatively sparse: for example,
parental education but not income is available. Second, smaller sample sizes result in
estimates that are considerably less precise than those from the College Board data.
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